Abstract-Grid operation relies on accurate short-term load forecast, and therefore, can become vulnerable to cybersecurity issues. The cyber adversary, once breaches the forecasting systems, may launch coordinated cyberattacks to covertly tamper with essential forecasting data including time series load and meteorological data and/or forecasting models. Detection and mitigation of data anomalies induced by such cyberattacks are more difficult. A previously introduced data analytics based method (DABM) using the so-called "Symbolic Aggregation approximation" (SAX) to detect abnormal patterns is further developed and its detailed evaluation is performed for forecast data compromised using different cyberattack templates. It is also demonstrated that attacks on weather data such as temperature may also be detected indirectly by applying the DAMB. A mitigation strategy is developed upon the detection of anomalies for a cybersecure forecasting scheme.
INTRODUCTION
The input and output data involved in load forecasting are mainly time series data. The input data to a short-term load forecasting varies with forecasting algorithms but may include (1) historical and forecasted weather data; (2) historical load data; and (3) other types of data such as dates of special events or public holidays. The output will be forecasted load or renewable generation data within a short time period. The increasing concern is the compromising of critical short-term forecasting data by a cyber adversary. As shown in [1] , anomalies in data induced by covert cyberattacks using carefully designed attack templates can be very difficult to detect using the current bad data or outlier detection methods and new detection methods are needed.
There are model-based methods (MBMs) and the data analytics based methods (DABMs). The example MBMs in forecasting data applications can be found in [2, 3] . The MBMs generally rely on some kind of forecasting model and may be vulnerable to well-coordinated attacks. For example, the adversary may not only compromise the temperature but also use it and forecasting model to generate data to replace the real demand, and the method in [3] is expected to fail.
DAMBs take advantage of the existing patterns of the data and can be less susceptible to coordinated cyberattacks, e.g., on both data and model, because eventually the attacks will cause abnormal input or output data in the forecast. In [4] , a Chebyshev Inequality (CI)-based method [5] and a secondorder-difference (SOD)-based method [6, 7] were developed used to cope with bad data, mainly point anomalies (See [8] for definition of point, contextual, and collective anomalies.) On the other hand, the abnormal patterns (i.e., collective anomalies) appear to be more difficult to detect since and the structure of the data has to be explored to recognize the patterns (see [9] for more details). A sophisticated adversary may falsify data points or models to create seemingly normal valued data points but with different patterns.
A prototype integrated solution for abnormal pattern detection, based on a combination of Heuristically Ordered Time (HOT) series based Symbolic Aggregation approXimation (SAX), SOD, and CI methods [10] , was introduced in [1] . However, the integrated solution was not evaluated in detail, especially against compromised data by using the attack templates developed in [1, 11] . In this study, the issue with the SAX method are identified and improved to enhance its detection capability. The attack templates developed in [1, 11] are used to generate different scenarios and the detailed evaluation of the improved method is conducted. In addition, it is also demonstrated that the method can be applied to detect the abnormal patterns in forecasting output due to attacks on more volatile weather data. This paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the SAX method and its improvement, parameter selection, and mitigation strategy. Section III demonstrates in detail the performance of the integrated solution in terms of contributions from SAX, SOD, and CI methods and mitigation in terms of impacts on the forecast. Different attack templates are used to launch the hideous cyberattacks on different forecast data. In Section IV, the conclusions and future work are presented.
II. AN DATA ANALYTICS BASED ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD FOR LOAD PROFILE
After obtaining control of the system and gaining access to the essential forecast data, the cyber attackers may be able to tamper with these data using different attack templates depending on the capability of the attackers. Several templates, namely scaling, ramping, pulse, random, forecasting model misuse (FMM), and forecasting model (FM) attacks, were described in [1, 11] . Among the input sets for potential forecasting models, the hour numbers, weekdays, and the load at the same hour of the previous day and previous week show strong patterns. For cyberattacks, anomalies are always expected to distort data of certain patterns (e.g., hourly load profiles). The SAX-based method [10] intends to identify "the most unusual discords or subsequences" in a sequence of given time series data. The least similar subsequences in time series usually indicate anomalies. (1) Equation (1) converts time series data of length n to m "frames" or segments of equal size by calculating the mean value of each segment. This formulates a piecewise aggregate approximation (PAA) of the time series [10] . The PAA representation can be further transformed into a discrete representation that produces symbols with equal-probability based on the SAX. The symbols corresponding to different frames constitute a SAX word. The mean values of the segments are converted to symbols according to a set of "breakpoints" that divide the distribution space into a number of equiprobable regions.
A sliding window of the pre-specified width (e.g., n=24) is used across the entire time series data set to extract and normalize subsequences, obtain a PAA representation, and convert the PAA coefficients into a SAX word. The distance between different SAX words or subsequences can be calculated. The largest distance (Euclidean distance measure is used) indicates the least similarity between one subsequence and the rest. This "unsupervised" method is particularly suitable for anomaly detection because, unlike supervised or semi-supervised approaches, it does not need to extract or learn "features" of good data, which is always difficult [8] , and use the features as the criterion to identify anomalies. SAX allows for both dimensionality reduction and lower bounding of L p -norms [10] .
In [1] , the SAX-method was, for the first time, introduced to detect collective anomalies with the load data by developing an integrated solution to pinpoint the SAX identified subsequences that overlap with or contain the anomalies identified by the SOD-and CI-based methods. Other subsequences identified by SAX-method would be discarded in order to reduce the false alarm rate. However, the latest experiments indicated that for many attacks, neither the SOD-nor the CI-based detection method is effective. The SAX method, on the other hand, performs consistently well in the sense that it is able to detect anomalies while raising some false alarms [1] .
Also in a recent study, one "blind spot" of the SAX method was identified, i.e., if a long (relative to the cycle of the data) sequence data with a constant or almost constant slope, the SAX word representations of the subsequence in the sliding window will not change, which implies that such subsequences are not rare or not anomalies. Apparently, due to the nature of load profile variations, the SAX word representations that are obtained by sliding the window across the daily load cycle cannot be the same for 24 hours. This rule was formulated to enhance the SAX-method and added to the integrated solution for detecting attacked data of relatively constant slopes.
Note that the approach in [12] is also based on the PAA of the smooth curve used to fit the load profile, and a so-called "longest common sub-sequence" (LCSS) concept to measure similarity of the PAA sequence. For the SAX method, the PAA is applied to normalized profiles of the original load data and the symbolic representation captures the Gaussian distribution of the normalized time series data including load profile, and is therefore a better approximation of the load patterns. The Heuristically Ordered Time (HOT) series based SAX method can be very computationally effective [10] .
In addition, parameter selection for SAX-method is very straightforward. The size of the sliding window (e.g., n) can be simply chosen as the cycle of the data, e.g., 24 hours for the load data. The number of segments (e.g., n seg =m) of a subsequence in a sliding window depends on how fast the data changes. A SAX word size (w s ) of 4 or 5 was experimentally shown to work based on many different data sets from different application domain [10] . At last, the threshold for considering a subsequence as an anomaly can be obtained by running the SAX method through the intact historical data to find out the largest distance among different subsequences.
A mitigation strategy is to discard the contaminated values and replace them with the forecasted values using the same load forecasting algorithm based on the prior measurements. That is, for each detected anomaly, the load value will be predicted using the needed input data until all anomalies will be replaced using the calculated load. The calculated load will certainly be different from but close to the measured ones. It should be noted that this mitigation process should start from the lowest index of the detected anomalies. This is because that other input data sets, e.g., the average load data in past 24 hours, may have to be updated based on the calculated load values
III. EVALUATION OF THE ANOMALY DETECTION METHODS
An hourly load profile for 30 days (or a total number of 720 data points from September 2nd to October 1st in a specific year) was obtained from the New England ISO. The short-term load forecasting model in [13] is used here to predict the load in next 24 hours. Therefore, the input needed for this prediction include load values of the 24 hours, September 30th (load at the same hour of the previous day), the load values of 24 hours, September 24th (the load at the same hour of the previous week), the forecasted temperatures and dew points at each hour of October 1st, the weekday of October 1st and whether October 1st is a working day, i.e., a total number of 24 data points for each of the above data sets. The integrated solution is applied here and the contributions from SAX, SOD, and CI methods are discussed in detail.
A. Anomaly Detection against Load Data Attacks
A straightforward attack is to compromise the some or all of the 24 load data points on September 30th. The scaling, ramping (Type II only), pulse, random, and smooth-curve attack templates [1, 11] were used to attack the load data. In all attacks, the starting and ending time steps (hours) are 696 (ns) and 720 (ne) except the pulse attack, which occurred at Hours 704 and 712, respectively. For the smooth-curve based attack, a third-order polynomial was used to generate the smooth curve [1] .
For the integrated solution, the distance threshold is given as 1.0 in SAX method. The width of the sliding window or discord size is 24 (based on the cycle of daily load variation), the number of segments within a sliding window is 8, and the SAX word size is 4. For the SOD-and CI-based methods, the thresholds were developed by using two years' historical load data prior to the load selected load profile.
A smooth-curve based attack was applied to the load on September 30th, i.e., from Hour 697, as can be seen in Fig. 1 . The integrated solution was used across the 30-days' load profile. Only SAX-method successfully identified the segments containing the anomalies and is shown by "x" in Fig. 3 . The segment between Hours [684, 720] was identified as the abnormal subsequence in the entire load profile. Both SOD-and CI-based methods failed to recognize any anomalies in this case because all load values along the curve seemingly normal and the transition between the normal data points and the attacked ones are smooth, i.e., the variations are within the threshold range, although the attacked load curve is completely opposite to the measurement data in Fig. 1 . The impact of this attack is significant, as indicated by the forecasting errors using the normal data (blue solid lines) and the attacked data (red dashed lines) in Fig. 2 . Using the attacked load data increases the forecasting errors at almost every single hour of day October 1st. The maximum deviation from the system actual load is more than 1,000 MW.
Using the mitigation strategy in Section III, the forecasting error can be reduced drastically, as seen in the lower portion of Fig. 3 . That is, starting from the first abnormal data point, the abnormal data (the measured load attacked by the cyber adversary) of September 30th will be replaced by the forecasting data using the load forecasting algorithm. The forecasted load is used to replace the measurement as input to the load forecasting algorithm to forecast the same hour on October 1st. the difference between the forecasting errors using measurement data and the attacked measurement data is almost negligible in Fig. 3 . It should also be pointed out that the data points between Hour 684 and Hour 697 were intact but included as part of the abnormal subsequence by the SAX method, therefore, still need to be replaced using the forecasted value, according to the mitigation strategy. Fig. 3 shows that this does not affect the forecasting much, as seen from the forecasting errors for day September 29th. This also implies that one may prefer to be conservative, i.e., identify more anomalies, as the mitigation strategy can handle these falsely identified anomalies without affecting much of the forecasting accuracy.
A pulse attack was performed by reducing the load value at Hour 704 by 20% and increasing the load value at Hour 712 by 20%. Fig. 4 shows the anomaly detection using the integrated solution. The anomaly data points detected by the SOD-and the CI-based methods are Hours 703, 704, and 712 (indicated by red squares in Fig. 4) . Note that SAX method fails to detect these two pulse attacks. This is mainly because that the modified load values are relatively small and does not significantly affect the discretized segment when the sliding window is applied. Although this can be done by increasing the alphabet size, e.g., from 4 to 6, it is preferred to use the current setting because it can better capture the collective anomalies while the point anomalies can be well captured by SOD-and/or CI-based methods. 5 shows the impact of such an attack. It appears that this attack does not have significant impact except at two points of the attack. In the lower portion of Fig. 5 , the blue solid line indicates the forecasting error using the load measurement data as input while the red dashed line indicates the forecasting error using the attacked load measurement data. It is observed that there are two spikes in the forecasting errors using the attacked data corresponding to the pulse attacks. By applying the same mitigation strategy, the spikes of the forecasted load corresponding to attacks were eliminated. The details of the mitigation effects are not shown here but summarized in Table I .
The third case is a random attack of the load of day September 30 th , i.e., load points from Hour 697 to Hour 720 will be changed randomly between -10% and 40%. Compared to the pulse attack, this random attack involved more data points, and therefore, are well-captured by the SAX method, as summarized in Table I . Note that SOD-and CI-based methods did not identify all attacks is because that some random changes can be fairly small. The fourth case is a ramping attack on the load data of day September 30 th with λ=0.014. The detected anomalies are shown in Table I . Note that all anomalies were detected by the SAX-method and SOD-and CI-based methods detected none in this case.
The impacts and the mitigation effects for both random and ramping attacks are also summarized in Table I . In Table I , MAPE represents the mean absolute percentage error of the hourly load in the next 24-hour forecasting. MAPE between time i and N is defined n Equation (2) as:
where A t and F t are the actual and forecasted hourly loads at time t, respectively. A smaller MAPE value indicates that the corresponding model produces more accurate forecasts. The maximum absolute percentage error (APE) and maximum error are self-explained. Table I shows all anomalies due to attacks were captured by the integrated solution and therefore, the integrated solution is very effective. It is also clear that SOD-and CI-based methods are more effective for point anomaly detection while the SAX-method for the collective anomalies. The MAPE, the maximum absolute percentage error, and maximum error of forecasted load were all significantly improved by applying the mitigation strategy to the detected anomalies in the historical load data. In particular, for the pulse and smoothcurve attacks, the mean MAPE, maximum APE, and maximum error are very close to those without any attacks.
B. Anomaly Detection for Attacks on Weather Data
Unlike the load profile, the weather data do not show a strong pattern and the intraday variations can be significant. Therefore, the SAX-method may not work well when directly applied to such attacked data, as indicated in Fig. 8 , where the temperature data at Hours 673 and 696 (i.e., the temperatures on the September 30th) were compromised with ramping template with λ= 0.03. This is a FMM attack since the attackers will also use the temperature and a forecasting model to modify the corresponding historical load profile. The SODand CI-based methods as well as SAX-method all failed to detect these collective anomalies in the temperature, as expected. Note that SAX method produced a number of false alarms without detecting the true anomalies in Fig. 6 . In this case, the SAX method was applied to the modified load on September 30th using the forecasting model and the compromised temperature as input. This change in the load is significant and can be detected by the SAX method, as can be seen in Fig. 7 . The mitigation strategy used above, however, is not applicable in this situation. A possible mitigation strategy may be the adoption of a similar day approach. This will not be further discussed. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Accurate load forecast is critical to an efficient and secure operation of the power grid. The increasing concern of cyberattacks on essential load forecasting data calls for the development of new methods to detect anomalies induced by skillful cyber adversaries. Such anomalies, especially those caused by attacks based on some templates introduced in [1] , are much more difficult to identify using the existing bad data or outlier detection methods, even the MBMs under certain circumstances (e.g., for the FMM attacks).
As a complementary approach to the MBMs, DABMs focus on characteristics of the time series data themselves, and therefore, may be more robust against cyberattacks on forecast related data. A SAX-based DABM has been enhanced and a mitigation strategy is proposed. In addition, a detailed evaluation of the performance of the enhanced SAX method is conducted against scenarios based on a set of attack templates [1, 11] . The SAX method is also used to the output of the forecast using compromised temperature data as input and detected the problematic output data successfully. The detailed performance evaluation of the enhanced SAX method shows its effectiveness and usefulness. It should also be pointed out that both MBMs and DABMs have pros and cons including different susceptibility to different threats. Having both of the methods is particularly important to cope with the increasingly dynamic and sophisticated cyber threats.
